Summary of State v. Weber, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 by Oakley, Danielle
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
9-15-2005
Summary of State v. Weber, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 57
Danielle Oakley
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Oakley, Danielle, "Summary of State v. Weber, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 57" (2005). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 583.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/583
State v. Weber, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Sept. 15, 2005)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – DEATH PENALTY 
 
Summary 
 An appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence of death, pursuant to a jury 
trial. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 Judgment of conviction and sentence of death affirmed. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 On April 4, 2002, Appellant T.J. Weber raped his girlfriend’s 14-year-old 
daughter, whom he had been molesting for five years, and killed his girlfriend, Kim, and 
her 17-year-old son.  Weber then fled Las Vegas and traveled to several other states 
before returning to Las Vegas on or before April 12.  On the morning of April 14, the day 
on which funeral services for the victims were to take place, Weber attacked Kim’s 15-
year-old son and the son’s care giver with a baseball bat.  Again, he fled.  Weber 
remained at large for two weeks.  Finally, on April 28, 2002, police located and arrested 
Weber. 
 In May 2002, a grand jury indicted Weber, charging him with seventeen felony 
counts.  The charges included two counts of open murder with the use of a deadly 
weapon, two counts of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, two counts of 
first-degree kidnapping, two counts of burglary, and various counts arising from Weber’s 
prolonged sexual abuse of his girlfriend’s adolescent daughter.  After indictment, the 
State filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty.  In February 2003, Weber 
received a jury trial and the jury found him guilty on all seventeen felony counts.  In the 
sentencing phase of Weber’s trial, the jury found the existence of thirteen aggravating 
factors.  It subsequently recommended a sentence of death for the murder of Kim’s son 
and a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the murder of Kim.  
 
Discussion 
 On appeal, Weber advanced a number of arguments: First, Weber argued that the 
district court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges against him; second, Weber 
argued that the district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence; third, Weber argued 
that the district court erred in denying his challenge of two jurors for cause, thereby 
denying him his right to a fair trial; fourth, Weber argued that the district court erred in 
instructing the jury on flight; fifth, Weber argued that the district court improperly denied 
his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search performed under authority of a 
search warrant that Weber maintains was improper; sixth, Weber argued that the penalty 
hearing of his trial should have been bifurcated; seventh, Weber argued that he should 
have made the final argument during his penalty hearing; and eighth, Weber argued that 
the State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty was flawed.  The Court denied all of 
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Weber’s claims.  Additionally, the Court reviewed Weber’s death sentence and 
considered the three questions required under NRS § 177.055(2).2 
 
I. Denial of Weber’s Motion to Sever Charges 
 
NRS § 173.115 provides that a defendant may be charged with multiple offenses 
in the same indictment if the offenses charged are “1.  Based on the same act or 
transaction; or 2. Based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or 
constituting parts of a common plan or scheme.”  Weber asserted that the joinder of all 
seventeen charges was improper under the statute and that his crimes should have been 
separated into three separate indictments.  Weber argued that the charges for his sexual 
crimes, spanning five years, against the fourteen-year-old could be joined together, the 
murders of April 4, 2002, could be joined together, and the beatings of April 14, 2002, 
could be joined together.  Weber maintained, however, that these three groups of crimes 
should have been kept separate and distinct.  The Court agreed that the three groups of 
crimes did not constitute a common plan or scheme and that joinder was inappropriate on 
that ground.3 
Nevertheless, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
joining the claims because the claims were “connected together” pursuant to NRS § 
173.115(2).  Having never interpreted the phrase “connected together” under this statute, 
the Court articulated that “for two crimes to be ‘connected together’ under NRS 
173.115(2), a court must determine that evidence of either crime would be admissible in a 
separate trial regarding the other crime.”4  The court determined that evidence of Weber’s 
crimes would have been admissible in trials for Weber’s other crimes because the 
evidence would have been relevant and because Weber failed to show that the admission 
of such evidence would have been unfairly prejudicial.  Accordingly, the court found that 
all of Weber’s seventeen counts were “connected together.” 
 
II. Admission of Hearsay Evidence 
 
Weber argued that the district court erred in admitting testimony of Kim’s friend 
regarding statements Kim had made to that friend on the day Weber murdered her.  
Kim’s friend testified that Kim had told her about a fight she had had with Weber the day 
before.  Kim’s friend testified to the following: 
She had told me that a boy had called for [her daughter]; that [Weber] had 
answered it and went crazy, cussed out the kid on the phone; proceeded to call 
[the daughter] names and call her a slut and racial gestures to her going out with 
black guys.   
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 (c) Whether the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating circumstance or circumstances; 
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And [the daughter] told Kim.  Kim was mad.  She told [Weber]: [my daughter] is 
going to be able to talk to boys and go out with boys.  You are not her boyfriend; 
you’re my boyfriend.  You need to start acting like a father figure, if you’re in her 
life, and not her boyfriend . . . . 
And she was going to drive her and her boyfriend wherever they wanted to go on 
a date . . . .5 
 
 The district court admitted the evidence, finding that it was not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted.  On appeal, the Court ruled that the testimony included 
several layers of hearsay, most of which were offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  
Nevertheless, the Court held that, although most of the testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay, the court’s admission of the testimony was not prejudicial.  The Court found that 
admission of the evidence was not prejudicial both because most of the evidence was 
admissible through other means and because the overwhelming evidence of Weber’s guilt 
rendered the hearsay testimony unnecessary for a guilty verdict. 
 
III. Denial of Weber’s Challenge of Jurors 
 
During voir dire, Weber challenged two potential jurors whom he believed were 
incapable of serving as impartial jurors.  The district court denied Weber’s challenges.  
On appeal, the Court found that the district court erred in denying Weber’s challenges, 
but found the error to be harmless.  The Court ruled that the district court’s error was not 
prejudicial because Weber eventually relieved both of the challenged jurors via 
peremptory challenge.  Although Weber exhausted all of his peremptory challenges 
during voir dire, he failed to allege that any of the jurors actually seated were not fair or 
impartial. 
 
IV. Flight Instruction 
 
At trial, Weber unsuccessfully objected to a jury instruction on flight.  On appeal, 
Weber argued that a flight instruction was improper because his arrest was delayed 
because of incompetent police work, not his flight.  The Court found Weber’s contention 
without merit.  A flight instruction is appropriate so long as it is supported by the 
evidence.6  The Court ruled that the evidence in Weber’s case supported a flight 
instruction.  Specifically, Weber abandoned his car on the day of the murders and 
traveled, by bus, to several states before returning to Las Vegas.  Furthermore, he 
purchased a fake mustache, and hid in his former home, despite police seal. 
 
V. Denial of Weber’s Motion to Suppress 
 
Weber argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
evidence of child pornography found on Weber’s computer depicting sex acts between 
Weber and Kim’s daughter.  Weber contended that the search warrants authorizing the 
computer searches were unconstitutional because they were based on “unsupported and 
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misleading probable cause statements.”7  The Court found Weber’s argument without 
merit. 
The Court found that the warrants had issued on probable cause supported by the 
affidavit of a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department detective.  The affidavit stated 
that Kim’s friend had told him that Weber was very computer literate, could make fake 
I.D.’s, used numerous fraudulent credit cards, and had run scams over the internet.    The 
Court found this information, along with the detective’s knowledge and experience, 
sufficient probable cause to search Weber’s computer. 
 
VI. Bifurcation of Penalty Phase 
 
Weber argued that his penalty hearing should have been bifurcated.  The Court 
summarily rejected the argument, citing McConnell v. State.8   
 
VII. Last Word at Penalty Hearing 
 
Weber argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to argue last to 
the jury in his penalty hearing.  The Court summarily rejected this argument, citing NRS 
175.141(5). 
 
VIII. State’s Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty 
 
Weber argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to strike the 
State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty.  Weber argued that the death penalty 
scheme is unconstitutional.  The Court refused to revisit its prior holding that the scheme 
is constitutional.9   
 
IX. Required Considerations under NRS § 177.055(2) 
 
NRS § 177.055(2) requires the Supreme Court to review every death sentence and 
consider, in addition to any errors enumerated on appeal, the following three issues: 
(c) Whether the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating circumstance or 
circumstances; 
(d) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice or any arbitrary factor; and 
(e) Whether the sentence of death is excessive, considering both the crime and the 
defendant.10 
 
A. Whether the Evidence Supported the Aggravating Circumstances 
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The jury found that thirteen aggravating circumstances existed during the penalty 
phase of Weber’s trial.  Aggravators one through eight were based on NRS § 200.033(2), 
which provides that “first degree murder is aggravated when it was committed by a 
person who has been convicted of a felony ‘involving the use of threat or 
violence.’”11The Court concluded, without discussion, that Weber used or threatened 
violence during the commission of the following felonies: the sexual assault of Kim’s 
daughter between January 1, 1997 and December 1, 1998; the first-degree kidnapping of 
Kim’s daughter on April 4, 2002; the sexual assault on Kim’s daughter on April 4, 2002; 
the first-degree kidnapping of Kim’s seventeen-year-old son on April 4, 2002; the 
attempted murder of Kim’s fifteen-year-old son on April 14, 2002; and the attempted 
murder of the fifteen-year-old son’s caregiver on April 14, 2002.   
The Court examined, and subsequently found sufficient evidence to support the 
finding of the use or threat of violence, in the two counts arising from Weber’s sexual 
assault of Kim’s daughter between January 1, 2000, and April 3, 2002.   
Aggravators nine through eleven were based on NRS § 200.033(4), which 
provides that first-degree murder is aggravated when committed while the perpetrator 
was engaged in “burglary, invasion of the home or kidnapping in the first degree, and the 
person charged . . . [k]illed or attempted to kill the person murdered.”12  Weber argued 
that this aggravator is invalid because it makes every felony-murderer eligible for the 
death penalty.  However, Weber was not convicted of felony murder; he was convicted of 
deliberate, premeditated murder and/or murder by torture.  Therefore, the Court found 
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that these aggravating circumstances 
existed. 
Aggravator twelve was based on NRS § 200.033(8), which provides that first-
degree murder is aggravated when it involves torture of the person killed.13  The Court 
previously held that torture “requires that the murderer must have intended to inflict pain 
beyond the killing itself.”14  Here, Weber murdered Kim’s son by binding his hands and 
feet with duct tape, placing weights on him so that he could not move, duct-taped his eyes 
and mouth, but left his nostrils free, and placed a plastic bag over his head.  Autopsy 
results revealed that the boy died a slow, suffocating death, both bleeding and vomiting 
out of his nose.  The Court found this sufficient to support a jury’s finding that Weber 
tortured his victim. 
Aggravator thirteen was based on NRS § 200.033(12), which provides that first-
degree murder is aggravated when “the defendant has, in the immediate proceeding, been 
convicted of more than one offense of murder . . . .”15  Weber was convicted of the 
murders of both Kim and her son. 
Accordingly, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
aggravating circumstances, as found by the jury. 
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B. Whether the Sentence of Death Was Imposed Under the Influence of Passion, 
Prejudice or Any Arbitrary Factor 
 
The Court concluded that there was no evidence that Weber’s sentence was 
influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.  To the contrary, the Court 
found evidence that Weber’s jury was discerning and that Weber’s crimes, themselves, 
caused the jury to recommend a sentence of death. 
 
C. Whether the Sentence of Death is Excessive, Considering Both the Crime and 
the Defendant 
 
The Court concluded that Weber’s crimes were particularly brutal and senseless.  
The Court found that, “[g]iven the appalling nature and circumstances of [Kim’s son’s] 
murder and Weber’s character as revealed by all his crimes, death is not an excessive 
sentence for Weber.”16 
 
Conclusion 
 Weber’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.  The Court found that the district 
court did not err in denying Weber’s motion to sever charges.  The district court did, 
however, err in admitting hearsay evidence and denying Weber’s challenges to two 
potential jurors.  The Court found, however, that these errors were not prejudicial.  The 
district court did not err in instructing the jury on flight, nor did it err in denying Weber’s 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his computer.  Furthermore, the court 
found without merit Weber’s arguments that the penalty phase of his trial should have 
been bifurcated, that he was entitled to make the last argument at his penalty hearing, and 
that the State’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional.  Finally, the Court reviewed 
Weber’s sentence, pursuant to NRS § 177.055(2), and found that the evidence supported 
the finding of aggravating circumstances, the sentence was not imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice, or an arbitrary factor, and the sentence was not excessive.  
 
Concurring Opinion 
 Justice Hardesty filed a concurring opinion, with which Justice Rose agreed.  
Although concurring in outcome, Justice Hardesty disagreed with the majority on two 
points.  First, Justice Hardesty disagreed with the Court’s conclusion that it was proper to 
join the counts arising from the April 14 beatings of the fifteen-year-old boy and his 
caregiver with the rest of the counts.  Nevertheless, Justice Hardesty agreed that the error 
was harmless. 
 Second, Justice Hardesty would interpret the term “connected together,” under 
NRS § 173.115, more narrowly than did the majority.  Justice Hardesty cautioned that 
cross-admissibility may be too lenient a standard.  He urged district courts to be 
“reluctant to join unrelated criminal acts for trial unless it is shown that the evidence of 
both crimes is clearly cross-admissible, that the two criminal incidents appear to be 
closely connected together, and that no substantial prejudice will occur to the 
defendant.”17  
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